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367 
The Prosecution Review Commission 
Process – Historical Analysis and  
Some Suggestions for Change 
 
CARL F. GOODMAN 
 
In 2013 I wrote an article entitled Prosecution Review Commission, The 
Public Interest, and the Rights of the Accused: The Need for a “Grown Up” 
in the Room.1  In that Article I suggested that: 
 
the PRC—as presently structured—has the potential to damage the 
personal reputations of Japanese and other nationals, undermine 
Japan’s relations with foreign countries, and harm Japanese democracy.  
These effects flow from the “reformed” PRC law taking away the 
“Japanese government’s control over the indictment process” and 
replacing it with the unbridled discretion of lay persons whose focus 
may be unduly skewed by the notoriety of the event or potential 
accused.  Members of the PRC lack the authority to consider the bigger 
picture because they have been mandated to perform a narrow role that 
looks solely at the event, rather than how indictment can affect the 
standing of the potential accused or Japan’s bigger interests.2 
 
  Carl F. Goodman is a retired partner in the Jones Day International Law Firm.  He is a 
former professor at Hiroshima University Hogakubu faculty, a Fulbright Scholar at Tokyo 
University, a visiting scholar at Chuo University and a former Adjunct Professor teaching Japan 
Law related classes at Georgetown University Law Center and George Washington University 
Faculty of Law.  He has been a visiting Professor at Temple University's Tokyo Law Faculty and 
at University of Washington in Seattle Washington.  He is the author of Justice and Civil Procedure 
in Japan (Oceana Publications Inc. 2004) and the much cited The Rule of Law in Japan: A 
Comparative Analysis (Kluwer Law Int’l 2003, 4th Revised Ed. 2017).  The paper herein is an 
update of and continuation explanation for the need to check the unbridled power of Prosecution 
Review Commissions to mandate prosecution because people's lives and reputations are at stake 
and because practice discloses that while Government policies and elections may be adversely 
affected by such mandatory prosecution decisions the reality is that few convictions follow such 
prosecutions.  Moreover, continuing debate about PRC outcomes diverts attention from the real 
problem that requires public input in Japan's criminal law system.  Namely, public participation to 
check the Prosecutor's power to prosecute akin to the Grand Jury's ability to reject a prosecution in 
the United States.  
 1. 22 PAC. RIM L&P JOURNAL 1 (2013).  
 2. Ibid. at 4. 
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I made several suggestions for changes in the law.  One suggestion 
“would create an additional body—learned in the law, removed from the 
prosecutor service, and above politics, composed of people whose 
experience assures that the interests of the accused, the government, and the 
public are considered before a PRC mandated prosecution goes forward.”  
At the time the article was written there had been 5 cases referred to 
prosecution by the newly empowered Prosecution Review Commission 
process of which 2 had resulted in not guilty verdicts with 3 cases pending.  
As of today’s date there have been a total of 9 PRC mandated prosecution 
cases; in 7 of these 9 cases the defendants were found not guilty at trial (the 
latest of these 9 cases (the case against three officials of Tokyo Electric 
Power Company (TEPCO) for professional negligence in connection with 
their alleged failure to sufficiently protect TEPCO’s nuclear facilities from 
the tsunami that led to the Fukushima Nuclear Tragedy) will likely be subject 
to several years of appeals before being finalized). 
In the 2 cases where a guilty verdict was rendered, neither defendant was 
sentenced to incarceration.  In one of those cases the defendant was fined the 
equivalent of $90 for what appears to have been a bar room tussle and in the 
other (involving a sumo instructor who injured a student) the defendant was 
given a suspended sentence.  The $90 fine case was one of the only 3 cases 
where mandatory indictment involved a “public figure.”  That case implicated 
a Mayor of a small town.  The other 2 public figure cases (both found not 
guilty after trial) involved a police official and an Opposition Party figure 
prominent in the only successful situations where the Ruling LDP Party was 
voted out of office.  The police officer was found not guilty because the 
prosecution was brought outside the time limits set by the applicable statute 
of limitations.  The Opposition Party figure was found not guilty but as noted 
in the 2013 article, not before the mandatory indictment “had serious 
political repercussions in Japan and caused political turmoil in the first non-
Liberal Democratic Party majority elected party and government in the Post 
War era.” 
In 2019 we are considering again the effect of public participation in the 
Japanese criminal Justice system by way of the Saiban’in trial and the  
PRC Mandated Prosecution procedure.  With 10 years of experience it is 
time to consider whether the PRC process has been a net benefit to Japan and 
its citizens or whether it has created more problems than benefits.  I continue 
to believe that the mandated prosecution system has caused more harm than 
good and that modifications of the system are called for to protect the rights 
of the innocent.  With 5 years of additional indictments by PRC’s and trials 
in such cases the case for amendment of the law has been strengthened. 
Like the Saiban’in Mixed Lay and Professional trial system (for a limited 
number of cases), the PRC system involves private citizen members of the 
4 - Goodman 7/29/2020  10:03 AM 
Summer 2020] Prosecution Review Commission Process 369 
public in Japan’s criminal procedure system.  I am a strong supporter of 
participation by the public in the criminal procedure process. But my concern 
for public participation deals with my concern for the rights of the accused 
while Mandatory Prosecution is, I believe, grounded in victim’s rights 
concerns.  My concern for the rights of the accused are grounded in the 
reality that the public Prosecutor’s Office is an arm of the State and that the 
State may have an interest in silencing or punishing citizens who do not 
support the Party in power or the policies of the State and that the criminal 
process is a way of silencing and/or punishing dissent.  Moreover in a 
criminal case the Prosecutor’s Office has a distinct advantage—it is part of 
a huge apparatus that contains trained police and prosecutors with 
laboratories to examine evidence and professionals in various fields to 
provide testimony and opinions that are relevant to the case.  It also has the 
power to question suspects (without the suspect’s counsel being present) for 
an extended period of time in an effort to extract a confession.  Indeed, in 
most cases that are prosecuted by the Prosecution Service the defendant has 
confessed prior to trial.  If the charges are disputed at trial the trial may 
become an issue not of guilt or innocence but whether the confession is 
reliable. 
The defendant lacks the resources of the prosecution team and lacks the 
funds to match the State’s pocket book.  Some of the advantages of the State 
continue in a PRC mandated prosecution—counsel for the prosecution is 
appointed by a court and is paid by the State; it has the reports of laboratory 
tests and interviews and other investigatory reports of the initial 
police/prosecutor investigations.  The Public Prosecutor’s office will have 
testified at the PRC proceedings giving the PRC prosecutor a file to work 
with.  Yet in 7 out of 9 PRC mandated prosecution cases the defendant has 
been found not guilty.  We should, as we review the PRC process and results 
of mandated prosecutions ask ourselves why the Professional Judges who 
decide PRC Mandated Prosecution cases have to date in virtually 80% of the 
cases disagreed with the PRC and found the defendant not guilty.  Do the 
figures tell us something that we have not seen because we are focused on 
the results rather than why those results have followed PRC prosecutions?  
Can it be that Judges have such high regard for the Prosecutor Service, both 
as to its prowess in solving crimes and in its use of discretion to suspend 
prosecution or opt not to prosecute that Judges for the most part decide that 
the Prosecutor was right not to proceed and does so by finding the charged 
Party not guilty? 
In a “normal” indictment case the most important adverse effects on the 
defendant’s case are seen at the early stages of the criminal process when the 
suspect is first arrested and then subjected to many long days of questioning 
by prosecutors; without counsel being present to aid the suspect.  Prosecutors 
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see the early stage as the time when they can extract a confession from the 
suspect—and they are usually correct.  If they need more time to get a 
confession they have mechanisms to get the time they need.  For example, 
they may charge the suspect with a new or related crime, e.g., a suspect can 
be charged over time with hiding a dead body, kidnapping and ultimately the 
crime that is actually being investigated—murder.  Each new charge gives 
the prosecutor a new 23 day window to continue interrogation. 
Most criminal trials in Japan involve a defendant who has confessed and 
much of the trial is devoted to determining whether the confession is reliable. 
After questioning the suspect who has confessed will be indicted and become 
an accused; suspects who do not confess (a very low percentage) but 
nonetheless are deemed by the prosecutors to be guilty will also be charged 
after questioning.  It is at the arrest stage and then the indictment stage that 
the accused in a normal indictment case is held up to the public limelight and 
becomes an “indicted” person.  This is particularly significant in Japan, a 
society where, whether the case is tried to a Saiban’in Panel or a single Judge 
trial, well over 95% of those accused/indicted who go to trial are found 
guilty.  So too a similarly high percentage of cases involve a defendant who 
has confessed.  The rare not guilty verdict may well come too late to 
rehabilitate the damaged reputation of the accused. 
In Mandatory Prosecution cases the accused will remain unindicted until 
after the PRC has twice ruled that the prosecutors were wrong in failing to 
indict.  The case will probably have made the headlines when the PRC made 
its initial decision for prosecution and will make headlines again when the 
party is made a subject of Mandatory Prosecution.  The case will, typically, 
take some additional time to be tried because there will have been no 
indictment by prosecutors so the private lawyer who is appointed 
prosecuting counsel will need to familiarize himself/herself with the facts 
and prepare for trial.  The trial will take time because it is likely that there 
has been no confession—if there had been a confession the case would have 
been prosecuted in the normal course or a suspension of prosecution would 
have resolved the case.  The typical not guilty verdict (almost 80% of PRC 
Mandatory Prosecution cases—7 out of the 9 cases tried under Mandatory 
Prosecution—end with a not guilty verdict) will take some additional time 
to be rendered and the likely appeals will take even more time.  Throughout 
this time the press may well debate the issue of guilt and the matter will (as 
it remains an open and an unusual case) remain in the public eye.  The 
accused party remains an accused person notwithstanding the Public 
Prosecutors decided not to indict.  The publicity likely will create additional 
opportunities to damage the accused’s reputation. 
The harm to the defendant’s reputation comes from the indictment and 
continues through the verdict in the case and may not be relieved by the not 
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guilty verdict.  Other harms may ensue depending on circumstances. Ichiro 
Ozawa’s criminal prosecution required him to step down from a leadership 
position in the Opposition Party that was seeking to unseat the virtually 
perennial LDP leadership in the Diet. Consequently he was disqualified from 
acting in the attempt to unseat the ruling party—a consequence that may have 
seriously affected the election and certainly adversely affected his standing 
as a politician.  If one believes that the continued dominance of the LDP 
comes not from overwhelming public approval of the LDP but because the 
Opposition has been found to lack the ability or capacity to effectively 
govern the likelihood is that Ozawa’s absence from the political scene was a 
factor in the election.  The charge of lack of ability to effectively govern 
would have been significantly more difficult to lie at Ozawa’s doorstep then 
it was at the door steps of Prime Ministers Yukio Hatoyama, Naoto Kan and 
Yoshihiko Nada all Democratic Party of Japan Prime Ministers (over a 
period of just over 3 years). 
 
Part 1 – The Role of the State in Preventing Private Vengeance 
 
In the mythical American West men strode the streets armed and ready 
to protect their space, their property, their wife, etc.  The West was seen as 
mostly lawless although it appears that if law came from the barrel of a gun 
because of the prevalence of firearms there should have been more law than 
there is today.  Myth has a powerful effect in defining a society both to itself 
and to others.  But we should recall that myth is after all myth. Even in the 
mythical West there was a role for government in the settlement of disputes 
between people.  The local sheriff (typically an elected official) played a role 
in diffusing disputes and in asserting the State’s right to protect citizens and 
enforce the law. Criminal law played its assigned role of regulating conduct 
that was deemed so abhorrent to be not just unlawful but illegal. Jury trial in 
serious criminal cases remained.  But why was the state involved in what 
likely were essentially private disputes?  What is wrong with having the Earp 
brothers settle their feud with the Clanton clan by shooting it out at the OK 
Corral?  What interest does the State have in peaceably resolving the dispute 
between the Hadley and the McCoy clans?  Why didn’t Hadley simply sue 
McCoy if there were a dispute? 
Criminal law is an aspect of public law wherein the State designs and 
enforces rules so as to prevent private wars and uncivilized resolution of 
disputes so that members of society can peaceably live together in a civil 
society.  Most disputes can be and are resolved through “civil” as 
distinguished from “criminal” law mechanisms.  Such civil mechanisms 
include the law of torts (delicts) which provides a remedy to an injured 
person hurt by the wrongful conduct of another.  Thus ordinary automobile 
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accidents do not rise to a criminal law concern but are resolved through a 
ticket for a traffic infraction (mollifying the State) or through compensation 
under the tort or delict law, while “trial” may be held in a civil (not criminal) 
court or by way of an alternative dispute resolution body.  Some conduct is 
so abhorrent, so destructive of civil society that the State can step in and 
exercise its right to maintain law and order.  Such conduct in the auto 
accident case would include, for example, vehicular homicide in which a 
party is killed as a consequence of an act of driving that is grossly negligent 
or driving under the influence of alcohol or other mind altering substances 
or a hit and run case in which a driver strikes a pedestrian and instead of 
stopping to give aid picks up and runs away.  Leaving the scene may result 
in exacerbating the injury to the pedestrian; allowing grossly negligent 
drivers to walk away from an accident where the party in the right is severely 
injured or killed might be seen as destructive of society by putting approval 
on such conduct because no criminal penalty is exacted by the State.  In a 
civil society there is a requirement that one stops and renders aid.  The role 
of criminal law is to enforce what are deemed to be important civic norms to 
make life better for the society in general.  The role of the civil law tort 
lawsuit is to compensate the victim for the injury caused by one’s negligence.  
There is a reason why a criminal case is entitled “People of the State of X v. 
defendant”; it is society (the People) that is being protected by the criminal 
law—the personal injury to the victim or the victim’s family is a matter for 
the civil law—for the tort or delict lawsuit. 
To enforce civic norms criminal law makes the State a principal player 
in enforcing law among people.  The State’s role in civil law matters such as 
compensating a person who has suffered a delict at the hands of another is to 
define rules regulating what is and what is not a wrong and providing a 
civilized mechanism for resolving interpersonal disputes regarding such 
alleged wrongs that caused damage.  Punishment of the tortfeasor is not part 
of the calculation or part of the trial.  The civil court system and civil court 
rules are state created and maintained so that compensation for injury may 
be given to those harmed.  The State’s role is exemplified by the Judge, who 
is a state employee.  Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as 
arbitration may substitute for the State (as is frequently the case in Japan).  
Of course the results of a criminal case may affect the civil tort case.  The 
issues tried in the criminal case and decided against the criminal defendant 
need not be tried again.  Rules that estop a defendant from litigating facts it 
has already litigated and were decided against the defendant in a Common 
Law system need not be litigated again.  This is especially so when a 
defendant is found guilty of a crime as the burden of proof to establish guilt 
is higher in a criminal case (beyond a reasonable doubt) than in a civil case 
(a preponderance of the evidence).  A not guilty verdict is not entitled to the 
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same effect because the burden of proof in a civil setting is lesser than to 
prove guilt—it may be that the criminal case failed because the higher 
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt could not be met but the civil damages 
standard of preponderance of the evidence was met.  In a sense they are res 
adjudicata.  In civil law societies the victim may also rely on the criminal 
conviction to assert a right to compensation, either as a part of the criminal 
trial or following but based on the judgment in the criminal trial.  A recent 
reform in Japan allows the victim to not only participate in the trial of the 
criminal case but also to ask for monetary damages from the defendant at the 
close of the criminal case.3 
The power to enforce the law through criminal adjudication includes the 
power to incarcerate citizens whose conduct is so obstructive of civilized 
society that they are separated from the rest of society and imprisoned as a 
punishment (or as a means of assuring that for at least some period of time 
they will not be free to commit additional crimes).  This is an improvement 
from the days when those who acted outside the criminal law were either 
maimed or killed.  And even in many modern societies (Japan and the United 
States included) capital punishment still is recognized as a means of 
enforcing conduct deemed so hurtful to civil intercourse that death is deemed 
an appropriate remedy.  Treason, the crime that John Adams and other 
Founders of the United States were engaged in was, and remains, punishable 
by death.  
Criminal law enforcement is fraught with dangers of possible abuse. The 
State, as an entity may have interests of its own.  Rulers of the State, 
especially rulers with an authoritarian bent, surely have their own interests 
in regulating the conduct of citizens; especially citizen conduct that can 
diffuse, limit or overthrow a ruler’s power.  King George III’s government 
likely would have sought the death penalty had John Adams been caught and 
 
 3. See Matsui, Justice for the Accused or Justice for Victims?: The Protection of Victims’ 
Rights in Japan, 13 ASIAN-PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL 54, 80 (2011).  “Victims may request 
that the defendant pay damages before the end of criminal trial.  This measure is available only to 
heirs of deceased victims or victims injured as a result of an intentional crime, rape or forcible 
obscene act, child abduction, abduction for ransom, and other offenses.  The application fee is 
2,000 yen (roughly $26 USD), which is quite inexpensive compared to the complaint fee, which 
must be paid in order to file a civil suit.  The judges who handled the criminal case will determine 
the defendant’s civil liability after conviction.  To determine the defendant’s civil liability, the 
judges will use the same evidence adduced at the criminal trials and court transcripts, which lessens 
the burden on the victims.  Hearings are limited to four times.  When judges believe that the 
defendant is liable, they order the defendant to pay damages.  If the defendant accepts the order, 
the order will have the same force of law as the judgment of the court.  If the defendant refuses to 
accept the order within two weeks after it is issued, the case will be transferred to another court as 
a regular civil suit.  Nevertheless, the court can use the evidence and trial transcripts from the 
criminal trials.  This system is generally called a―damage order system.  This system substantially 
reduces the burden on victims who seek damages.” (Footnotes omitted.) 
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transported back to England.  Autocratic governors may see imprisonment, 
death or even damage to reputation and the threat of imprisonment of 
opponents as the best means for preserving their authoritarian rule.  States 
and autocratic rulers of States have police and prosecutor powers and 
bureaucracies at their disposal.  These powers include the power, in some 
situations, to take away freedom of citizens; which raises the questions “who 
polices the police” and “who prosecutes the prosecutors” and who decides 
the case—a Judge, a Jury or a Saiban’in Panel?  To moderate the power of 
the State to obstruct and/or take away the rights of citizens, societies have 
adopted some mechanisms to allow citizen’s to have direct participation in 
the criminal law process. 
The common law petite jury serves the function of allowing the “public” 
(through the jurors selected to decide a case) to stand between the public 
officials who may be seen as aligned on one side of the case—the police, 
prosecutors and Judges—and ordinary citizens or residents accused of 
criminal conduct, on the other side.  To temper the power of the State actors 
the decision reached in the case is made by a body of ordinary citizens (or at 
least ordinary citizens are given a veto power over the decision of the State 
actor public employees).  The Saiban’in System was adopted to provide a 
voice for the public in deciding guilt or innocence (and having a say in the 
sentencing of those found guilty) in cases involving certain high profile 
crimes.  Under this citizen participation system ordinary citizens can check 
or moderate the voice of the Judges, while the voice of the Judges can equally 
check or moderate the voice of the lay jurors. 
The PRC while having private citizen involvement does not have the 
same ability to check the actions of the prosecutor service.  It cannot review 
and/or reject the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute a crime and thus 
potentially take away the freedom and/or reputation of citizens.  In Japan 
there is no public input when a prosecutor decides to prosecute.  There is 
only PRC public input when a prosecutor decides not to prosecute.  But the 
harm of the potential abusive power of the State is not involved in the 
decision not to prosecute it is involved in the decision to prosecute.  Japan 
has no equivalent of the Federal Grand Jury that provides citizens who stand 
between the State (represented by the prosecutor) and the suspect and which 
can refuse to allow the State Prosecutor to prosecute an individual; or not 
prosecute for a crime that carries a high punishment rather than a crime with 
a lesser punishment.  The PRC cannot reject the prosecutor’s attempt to take 
away a citizen’s or resident’s freedom—it can only require that someone be 
prosecuted for an alleged crime and thus made subject to the power of the 
State after the State has itself concluded that the citizen/resident not be 
subjected to the criminal law process and (potentially) the criminal law 
punishment. While such a process may be relevant and appropriate when the 
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subject of the complaint is the State itself or a significant State Actor no PRC 
case has yet led to conviction of a significant State actor—a small town 
mayor involved in an after working hours bar room brawl (a fine equivalent 
to $90 USD.) hardly represent the type of or level of potential corruption that 
the Occupation was seeking to reach by suggesting the initial PRC statute.  
The small town Mayor was not charged for conduct performed in his 
capacity as Mayor—he was charged with an out of office off duty pushing 
of a woman in a bar in a case where a principal witness recanted his 
testimony on appeal—but as is usual in Japan the conviction was nonetheless 
upheld. 
The United States Constitution’s Bill of Rights is filled with rights 
granted to those accused or suspected of committing a crime.  Thus: 
 
The Fourth Amendment prevents the government from 
engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures and further provides 
that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized”, 
The Fifth Amendment not only protects the suspect or accused 
by granting such person the right to remain silent and thereby not 
incriminate him/herself thereby making it incumbent on the 
prosecutor to prove guilt.  The Fifth Amendment also provides, “No 
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb” and further provides that no person shall be “deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law”, 
The Sixth Amendment provides “the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed” and gives 
the accused the right to confront witnesses against him/her. 
 
John Adams, perhaps the most vocal voice for starting the American 
Revolution, could take comfort in these amendments especially the 
amendments that provided for a Grand Jury indictment for felonies and the 
right to trial in the district where the crime was committed.  Adams had 
committed treason—he had advocated and stirred others to revolution 
against the lawful government.  He knew that if charged in Massachusetts no 
Massachusetts Grand Jury would indict him and further that if the Crown 
could force a Grand Jury to indict no Massachusetts Petite Jury (the district 
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wherein the crime was committed was Massachusetts) would convict.  The 
founders were well aware of what it meant to be accused of crime. They were 
personally and directly concerned with the rights of the accused.  Because 
the State was the moving party and influence in a criminal trial they were 
concerned with restricting and limiting the power of the State by giving the 
accused in criminal cases rights against the State.  They were not simply less 
concerned about questions concerning the rights of the victim of a crime they 
were unconcerned with such questions.  It was government, the new United 
States Government they were creating, that was seen as the potential threat 
to personal liberty and thus the government’s powers were to be limited by 
the people’s rights.  Victim’s rights are not contained in the Bill of Rights 
and were not the subject of the criminal law.  The Constitution’s primary 
concern was to regulate, contain and control the power of the government.  
Victims seeking compensation were relegated to the civil law courts and the 
Common Law. Such victims if suing under the Common Law, such as suing 
for the tort of assault arising out of a sexual assault (a criminal act punishable 
by the State through criminal prosecution), were afforded the Common Law 
right to trial by jury if the claimed damages exceeded the sum of $20.4  In 
such a jury trial case ordinary citizens would decide the case (after being 
briefed on the law by the presiding Judge) and would also be involved in 
determining the amount of damages recoverable for the harm caused by the 
defendant (assuming a judgment for the Plaintiff). 
The PRC law would not have allayed John Adams’s concerns.  If 
anything it would have exacerbated his concerns because it expands the 
power of the State mechanism to do harm by allowing citizens to determine 
that a criminal case be brought against others even when the State 
mechanism, the Prosecutor Service, has decided that no crime has been 
committed or if a crime has been committed that prosecution against the 
suspect should not proceed.  It does not cabin and prevent private vengeance; 
it enables private vengeance and cabins prosecutorial discretion to look the 
other way.  It not only pays the expenses of carrying out such vengeance by 
paying the private attorney who prosecutes the Mandatory Prosecution case 
(while the defendant must shoulder its own expenses) but publicly accuses 
the defendant of committing a crime thus adversely affecting reputation and 
holds over the defendant’s head the threat that the State will take away 
personal freedom. Rather than limiting private vengeance it enables private 
vengeance and makes the State a party to such vengeance. It is a private party 
(or private parties) who initiate the complaint to a PRC for review of the 
 
 4. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution provides: “In Suits at common law, where 
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, 
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law.” 
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prosecutor’s no prosecution determination. 
Victims, of course, have a legitimate concern that their rights be 
protected and the civil justice system in Japan may fail them in some respects 
in this regard.  Unlike the United States civil legal system damage 
assessment in a Japanese civil case is a matter for the Judge not a matter for 
a jury made up of ordinary citizens. Judges tend to follow what other Judges 
have done so that damages in certain areas—automobile accident cases, 
recently expanded medical malpractice case, etc.—are standardized.  And 
monetary damages in Japan are low compared to American damage 
standards.  Japanese law recognizes set offs from damage awards when other 
sources of compensation come into play—Japan has no “collateral source” 
rule such as exists in the U.S. Punitive damages are against Japanese public 
policy and not available to Japanese plaintiffs.  So too, foreign judgments for 
punitive damages are not granted comity by Japanese Courts.5  Moreover, it 
may be more difficult for plaintiff in a civil suit to meet its burden of proof 
in Japan where the judge must (except in cases where the burden of proof 
has been shifted by legislation) be convinced that the plaintiff is correct 
rather than the more liberal weight of the evidence standard generally 
applicable in the United States.6 
To help crime victims receive compensation for the harm caused by the 
criminal conduct proved at the trial Japan enacted legislation to permit 
victims to participate in certain categories of criminal cases brought by the 
State and to ask for damages in such criminal cases.  As Professor Setsuo 
Miyazawa has earlier noted: 
 
In cases involving serious crimes such as homicide, injury, rape, 
professional negligence resulting in death or injury, or kidnapping, 
the victim, surviving family member or their legal agent may sit 
behind the prosecutor in the trial, may seek explanations from the 
prosecutor about his exercise of his legal authorities, may question 
witnesses and defendant, and may present an opinion following the 
examination of all evidence, including sentence.  Once the court has 
found the defendant guilty, the same court may order the defendant 
to pay a civil damage upon application from the victim.7 
 
How such victim participation affects the Judges hearing the case—
 
 5. Case No. 1993 (0) No.1762 (Supreme Court, Petty Bench, 7/11/97). 
 6. See generally, Carl F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS (Kluwer Law Int’l, 4th rev. ed., 2017) Chapter 14, Section 14.03 [B] [3]. 
 7. Setsuo Miyazawa, Citizen Participation in Criminal Trials in Japan: The Saiban-in 
System and Victim Participation in Japan in International Perspectives, 42 INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF LAW, CRIME AND JUSTICE 71, 74 (2014). 
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especially citizen Judges on Saiban’in Panels in, for example, homicide 
cases—is yet to be determined.  Here again the victim’s rights movement 
may have made it more difficult for the defendant to get a fair trial in which 
emotion plays second fiddle to the facts as demonstrated by the evidence 
presented in open court. 
If victims are denied appropriate monetary damages in civil cases and 
thus must seek compensation through vengeance sought under the criminal 
law then the civil law should be amended to allow victims to recover more 
reasonable damage awards.  While this may be difficult to achieve and 
especially difficult in Japan’s male oriented society in cases involving sexual 
assault, that is no excuse for abusing the criminal Justice system in ways that 
may provide an opening for an authoritarian government to abuse the system 
for its own purposes.  Freedoms of the defendant in a  criminal trial benefit 
us all as we all may someday be a defendant and as we all need to protect the 
democratic system from potential abuse by State actors.  As currently 
structured the PRC does not aid in this goal—it does not provide protections 
against wrongful prosecution or wrongful conviction. 
 
Part 2 – The Harm Caused by the Current System which Allows 
Mandatory Indictment by the Prosecution Review Commission 
 
A. First Do No Harm 
 
1. Taking the air out of the discussion of whether there should be 
public participation that can limit the ability of the Public 
Prosecutor to indict 
 
The concept that a doctor should “first do no harm,” that she should take 
into account the harm that treatment may cause to the patient before a 
decision to proceed is made is well known in the medical field.  I suggest it 
has equal relevance in the legal arena.  I believe that by submitting ourselves 
to debate and discussion of the PRC Mandatory Prosecution system without 
at the same time discussing the proper role of the public to screen the 
prosecutor’s decision to indict, we draw attention away from the more 
important issues of how to properly make use of citizen participation in the 
early stages of the criminal process to assure that Prosecutors do not abuse 
their indictment power.  The PRC is limited solely to checking the 
prosecutor’s ability to allow a person or entity to go free without a trial.  Yet 
this right to “prosecutor discretion” is a long-standing right both in U.S. law 
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and Japanese law and is frequently used in Japan.8  The 2014 White Paper 
on Crime informs us that Japanese prosecutor’s frequently utilize their 
authority to exercise their discretion not to prosecute.  Indeed, statistics in 
that report disclose that prosecutors refused to indict someone in more than 
90% of cases referred to them by the police in 2013 and that they suspended 
prosecution in more than 50% of referrals.9  These percentages relate to cases 
referred to the prosecutor’s office by the police—they do not take account of 
the cases that are washed out at the police level in order to give the suspect 
an opportunity to rehabilitate.  Both Japanese Police and Prosecutors appear 
to have greater understanding of the need to rehabilitate those who violate 
the law then do Police and Prosecutors in the United States where Criminal 
Law has more of any “eye for an eye” and “let the punishment fit the crime” 
than a rehabilitation emphasis. 
A suspension of prosecution is essentially a determination by the 
prosecutor that the defendant is guilty but that rehabilitation is likely if the 
defendant is given a second chance.10  Suspension of prosecution traces its 
origins to at least 1909.  It is rooted in Japan’s preference for deterrence of 
crime via rehabilitation over punishment.  Rehabilitation is more likely to be 
achieved if the subject does not have a criminal record that stands in the way 
of responsible employment and making a new crime free life.  A prison is by 
definition composed of a society of “outlaws,” i.e., those who have in 
common the fact that they have acted outside the law.  This is not a good 
society in which to nurture crime free values. 
Suspension of Prosecution is an example of giving a person a second 
chance—but a real chance not a chance hampered by a criminal conviction 
of record. If the subject refuses to make use of that second chance the subject 
is not likely to be treated so easily a second time.  Suspension takes into 
account the victim and frequently will require making the victim whole 
financially as well as requiring the accused to make a formal apology to the 
victim.  The potential pool of victims aggrieved by the suspension or no 
prosecution decision is large and the number of Mandatory Prosecution cases 
 
 8. Not only can a prosecutor in Japan exercise discretion by refusing to indict and prosecute, 
(Japan v. Fukumoto, 1006 Hanji 22 (Sup. Ct. 6/26/81—prosecutor within his discretionary rights 
in prosecuting only one side in bribery case) but the Prosecutor Service may “suspend 
prosecutions” in cases where the Prosecutor believes the defendant is guilty (and indeed believes 
that the Prosecutor Service will be successful at trial).  Suspension starts with the assumption of 
guilt provable at trial but allows for the case to atrophy because the prosecutor believes that the 
defendant can be rehabilitated and that “suspension” will allow for rehabilitation whereas trial and 
conviction will impede rehabilitation.  See Carl F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Kluwer Law Int’l, 4th rev. ed., 2017) p. 384 fn. 204 and materials cited 
therein. 
 9. White Paper on Crime 2014 Chart 2-2-2-1; . 
 10. CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Kluwer 
Law Int’l, 4th rev. ed., 2017). 
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is quite small—9 to date.  The seeming contradiction may be accounted for 
in part by the fact that PRC’s tend not to suggest indictment—indictments in 
the 9 cases all either involved a noteworthy event, perhaps involving a 
corporation that caused harm but whose management was not indicted by the 
prosecutor’s office or a political personage.  Since PRC’s tend not to 
recommend indictment after the Public Prosecutor has decided not to indict 
(or at least tend not to recommend indictment two times so as to cause 
mandatory indictment)11 we do not know whether PRC’s would, if given the 
chance, choose to reject indictment in any cases where the prosecutor has 
decided to indict.  But, there should be public participation in the important 
decision to charge a member of the public with a serious criminal offense 
and the public, through representation on a panel such as the PRC should be 
allowed to say NO to the prosecutor, especially when the freedom and/or 
freedoms of other citizens is at stake.  The power to indict and take away 
freedom is too great a power to leave in the hands of government officials 
without some form of public review.  The Grand Jury provides for such 
review and can provide a model for public participation in the decision to 
accept or reject a Prosecutor’s indictment decision.  Expanding the PRC law 
to provide for such review in cases of filing charges for serious crimes would, 
it is suggested, be a valuable addition to the PRC law and to public 
participation in the criminal process in Japan. 
The question of whether PRC’s would support indictment is not raised 
by the PRC law because the PRC has no authority to review the decision to 
indict and while the number of cases where indictments are issued is reduced 
by the benevolence of prosecutors in Japan12 there remain many cases where 
prosecutors proceed based on little more than scant evidence or a defendant’s 
confession obtained under circumstances that would be subject to question 
in the United States.  Japanese suspects are not entitled to “Miranda rights” 
and “Miranda warnings” and are not allowed to have counsel present during 
interrogation sessions.  The opportunity of the prosecutor to question a 
suspect without counsel being present and to do so for an extended period of 
time (typically 23 days, but which may be further extended) may lead to false 
confessions. False confession cases are gaining more notoriety in Japan just 
as they are in the United States.  Indeed the disclosure of many false 
confession cases has spurred the movement toward full recording of 
 
 11. Since adoption of the amended PRC law allowing Mandatory Prosecution ten years ago 
only 9 cases have been subject to Mandatory Prosecution—an average of less than 1 per year. 
 12. Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CALIF. L. 
REV. 317 (1992). 
4 - Goodman 7/29/2020  10:03 AM 
Summer 2020] Prosecution Review Commission Process 381 
police/prosecutor interviews of suspects in Japan.13  A grand jury type 
mechanism could provide for a public window on the procedures by which 
confession was obtained. 
The question of whether the PRC or some other body with the power of 
an American Grand Jury would indict is a serious question.  Just as the petite 
jury in the United States serves as a buffer between the Judge and the 
Prosecutor (both employees of the State) on one side, and the defendant and 
counsel (both (typically) not employees of the State)14 on the other, so too the 
Grand Jury is a buffer between the Prosecutor and the public.15  In an American 
federal criminal case an indictment is required before a serious crime case can 
proceed and that indictment when sought by the prosecutor is in the hands of 
the Grand Jury.  No similar buffer exists in Japan and while a PRC looks to 
some extent like a Grand Jury it lacks the basic function of the Grand Jury—
to protect the public against a too active prosecutor by deciding whether the 
prosecutor has enough evidence to make out a prima facie case of the suspect’s 
guilt before a person is formally charged with, i.e., indicted for a serious crime.  
That question is not asked in Japan; in part because academics and others are 
spending time dealing with the mandatory indictment authority of the PRC 
(used less than once a year on average) not the lack of authority of the PRC or 
any other body to deny a prosecutor the right to indict.  Yet it is the right to 
indict that is the more serious as charging a person with a crime is the first step 
in the process by which the State as an entity can take away freedom of 
citizens.  And because the number of PRC cases that lead to mandatory 
indictment has yet to reach 10 over the life of the new Mandatory Prosecution 
amendment while many thousands of indictments have been issued during the 
same period, the potential greater problem or issue is being sidetracked. 
Looking at the PRC mandatory indictment process while not considering a 
role for a PRC or Grand Jury style review of indictments is, I suggest, looking 
at citizen participation in criminal Justice matters in Japan through the wrong 
end of the telescope.  The result is that a big problem is made small and a small 
 
 13. Jiji Press, 6/7/18, Police Fully Recorded Large Share of Grillings.  Data in the article 
shows some recording of interrogation had been achieved in 81.9 percent of interrogations while 
in cases tried before a Saiban’in Panel full recording were had in over 70% of cases in 2017. 
 14. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); “The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal 
and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced 
and justice administered.  A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent 
oppression by the Government.  Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and 
experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate 
enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority.  The framers of the 
constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against 
arbitrary action.  Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an 
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, 
biased, or eccentric judge.” 
 15. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992). 
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problem is regarded as big.  By sucking the air out of discussion of tempering 
or subjecting to question the decisions of prosecutors—agents of the State—
to indict the PRC mandatory indictment discussion may be creating harm by 
sidetracking discussion of whether there is an appropriate role of citizens in 
determining whether an indictment should issue.  What should be discussed is 
whether the PRC should be given the power of the Grand Jury to accept or 
reject an indictment based on whether the prosecution can make out a prima 
facie case of guilt. 
 
B.  Do No Harm from a Substantive Prospective  
 
Do no harm has both a procedural aspect and a substantive aspect.  On 
the procedure side it should be noted that harm can occur to the criminal 
justice process by simply accepting things as they are and not questioning 
matters, as noted above.  On the substantive side, allowing a group of citizens 
to force a prosecution when the professional prosecutors have decided 
otherwise may result (and as the first 9 cases tried under the PRC mandatory 
indictment procedure shows has resulted) in substantial harm.  Although 
only 9 Mandatory Prosecution cases have been filed, that harm has already 
flowed to parties indicted; the Japanese public and to Japan’s political 
system. 
 
1. Harm to the Accused 
 
An accused person is subjected to harm in the early stages of all criminal 
cases. While he/she may have a right to counsel that right is limited in Japan 
by the prosecutor’s right to make its case.  Moreover while the accused has 
a right to bail the reality is that bail does not come into play until the accused 
becomes a defendant—has been charged, i.e., indicted. While judges can 
grant bail at an earlier stage the “right” is illusory as bail is not just typically 
but virtually always, denied at an early stage—and typically denied until the 
accused has confessed; paving the way for indictment and conviction.16  The 
formalistic grounds for denial of bail are that there is fear the accused 
defendant will conceal or destroy evidence.17  When bail is granted (as it was 
eventually in Ghosn’s case—months after his arrest and indictment) the 
 
 16. “The Code of Criminal Procedure allows bail at the discretion of the judge, but serious 
crimes, habitual defendants, those previously sentenced to imprisonment for over ten years and 
those without a fixed address cannot get bail. Judges may deny bail if there is danger that a 
defendant will destroy evidence or cause harm to others once released.  CARL F. GOODMAN, THE 
RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 405 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 4th rev. ed. 2017). 
 17. Reuters, 1/15/19, Tokyo court denies Nissan Ghosn’s latest bail request “It is rare in 
Japan for defendants who deny their charges to be granted bail ahead of trial.” 
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former head of Nissan it was hedged with serious damaging conditions—he 
is forbidden to see his wife while out on bail.18  Indeed since Japan lacks the 
same speedy trial rules as are applied in the United States the Constitutional 
right to a speedy trial is virtually meaningless.  Ghosn’s trial is scheduled to 
begin in April 2020 after having been postponed, at the request of 
prosecutors, from an originally scheduled September 2019 date.19  He was 
arrested in November 2018 meaning trial is scheduled to begin almost a year 
and a half after his arrest.  Whether a further extension of the trial date will 
be sought and granted is unclear at this time. Meanwhile, while he is out on 
bail he is forbidden to see his wife.  The failure to provide bail—at least 
before the defendant confesses—has been referred to as “hostage Justice” as 
the accused is held hostage until he confesses.  So far, it appears that bail has 
not been an issue in PRC Mandatory Prosecution cases.  Perhaps that is 
because the Prosecutor service had not brought the charges and the police 
had not arrested the accused, leading to the conclusion that there was no need 
to extract a confession from the subject of the PRC review and Mandatory 
Prosecution. 
Once the PRC Mandatory Prosecution process has been initiated the 
other adverse effects of being a defendant in a criminal case do come into 
play.  Moreover as PRC cases are rare some consequences may come into 
play with increased impact.  Thus the fact of PRC indictment (because rare) 
becomes a newsworthy matter bringing the charges to the notice of friends, 
business associates, neighbors and indeed the public at large.  The PRC 
process will likely keep the pressure of having been indicted and now the 
subject of a criminal trial on the suspect for an extended (years long) period 
of time as the process winds through its required stages of PRC suggestion 
for indictment, Prosecutor review of the matter and decision and then return 
to a PRC procedure to consider the prosecutors denial to prosecute and now 
awaiting the trial and then the decision by the Court.  The emotional highs 
and lows encountered by the accused during this several year process must 
be enormous.  Reputation is placed under a microscope and this cannot be in 
the interest of the party being prosecuted.  As Japanese criminal cases tend 
to take a long time before resolved, a cloud may hang over the head of the 
 
 18. Kyodo News, 4/26/19, Ex-Nissan boss Ghosn released on bail, but barred contact with 
wife, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2019/04/08879582d268-urgent-ghosn-granted-release-
on-bail-by-tokyo-district-court.html.  Bail was granted in April 2019.  If trial is started in April 
2020 as anticipated he will have been forced not to see his wife for at least a year.  Better than not 
being out of jail on bail—but surely punitive. 
 19. Nikkei Asia Review, 3/20/19, Yusuke Konishi, Ghosn trial to start in September under 
accelerated process.  As the dates clearly show his original trial date was set in March 2019 to start 
6 months later “under an expedited procedure.”  However in September 2019 it was rescheduled 
at the request of the prosecutors, for April 2020.  JAPAN TODAY, 9/21/19, Prosecutors set April 
date for Ghosn hearings. Ghosn was initially arrested in November 2018.  
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accused for years. 
Costs will begin to pile up as the accused will hire counsel to defend 
against the charges (while the PRC gets a Court appointed counsel paid by 
the State) and likely will have incurred expenses while the PRC process was 
being played out as the accused sought to sway the views of the PRC.  The 
accused party has likely been under suspicion for a long period of time while 
the PRC two stage procedures continued to determine whether the 
prosecutors improperly refused to indict. 
The defense expenses likely will multiply as the case moves forward as 
it must inexorably do.  Putting on a defense is expensive.  Time must feel as 
if it has almost stood still as the trial itself will in all likelihood take an 
extended period of time.  (Japanese criminal trials—except for Saiban’in 
trials—do not take place in a compact period of time and proceedings do not 
continue on a daily basis until completed.)  The time from reference to the 
PRC through trial will likely feel as if it is crawling as the defendant tries to 
hold his life together while assisting his counsel in his defense.  If his 
employer keeps him on he will be fortunate—even an employer who wants 
to keep him on might feel it cannot because his mind is clearly going to be 
on his trial not his job and the Japanese trial is, except in Saiban’in cases a 
long running affair.  His life will be in turmoil.  If he is found not guilty—
the typical result in PRC mandated trials—he will never recover the years 
lost while his defense was being tried at the PRC and in court.  The fear that 
he will be convicted—even though he knows/believes in his innocence—
will take an enormous toll on his psychological well-being.  All of this 
occurring in a scenario where the professional prosecutors have determined 
he should not be charged and tried.  When found not guilty (assuming that 
result) he will need to rebuild his life but can never regain the time lost to his 
defense or the psychological trauma he has undergone. 
What public interest—as distinguished from personal vengeance is 
served—especially as the first decade statistics regarding Mandatory 
Prosecution cases shows that he is most likely to be exonerated.  Do the 
Judges know something that the PRC members do not know?  Do they know 
that if the prosecutor has decided not to prosecute Judges are predisposed to 
believe that he is most likely to be correct?  Do they know that the Prosecutor 
Service has such power/reputation/standing with the Court that the decision 
on the Prosecutor will, except in the rare case, be upheld by the Judicial 
Branch and that this deference to the Prosecutor Service may apply to both 
its decisions to prosecute and not to prosecute?  The Court knows that 
prosecutor tried cases are almost always won by the prosecutor and the Court 
knows that prosecutors use their discretion to dismiss or “suspend 
prosecution” in a high percentage of cases—even serious crime cases.  Does 
this mean that the private lawyer appointed to prosecute the case must both 
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prove that the prosecutor was wrong in exercising its discretion as well as 
bearing the burden of showing that the defendant is guilty? 
Are Judges less likely to dismiss a PRC Mandatory Prosecution case on 
legal grounds early in the trial process than they are to dismiss other cases?  
The PRC Mandatory Prosecution case against the Vice Chief of Police was 
eventually decided in favor of the defendant because it was untimely 
brought; the statute of limitations had run—the same grounds on which the 
public prosecutors had decided it was not proper to indict.  But time was not 
a seriously contested fact issue in the case.  The reality was that time did not 
require an extended trial process—it required someone with an adding 
machine and knowledge of the law.  Why wasn’t the case dismissed at an 
early stage based on the numerical counting of days, months or years?  Could 
it be that the Judges considered that they needed to allow a normal trial to 
take its course because the PRC process had led to the indictment and it 
would be an insult to the PRC process and members to dismiss the case too 
soon?  Could the Court have waited to deal with this legal issue out of 
concern that the public and/or the PRC would object or complain that not 
enough time was taken to determine the legal question if the trial process 
was upended by an early decision to dismiss on purely legal grounds?  One 
would expect defense counsel to raise the limitations argument early in the 
case—yet it took an extended period of time for the court to dismiss on 
Statute of Limitations grounds.  Every day the case was pending was another 
day that the Vice Chief of Police had to suffer because of the faulty 
indictment.  Is this an appropriate role for Judges or for the Judicial Process 
in general? 
If the accused is successful at the trial court level the matter is not 
finished—appeals taking more years are likely in the offing.  Japanese 
appeals are not restricted to the record made in the trial court as is the rule in 
the United States.  New evidence may be presented and new arguments made 
at the appeal level.  To the PRC prosecutor there is no downside to appeal 
and indeed the lawyer may feel an obligation to appeal to show that he is 
doing his duty to the PRC that twice rejected the Public Prosecutors’ 
determination.  Appeal will involve more expense to the accused, both 
financial and psychological. 
It should be emphasized that while the sample is small (it is the only 
sample we have) it does show that something in the order of 75% of all 
Mandatory Prosecution cases end in not guilty verdicts.  And this in a society 
and legal system where conviction rates in criminal cases brought by the 
Prosecutor Service exceed 95%. 
Of course if the accused is in fact guilty there could be justification for 
such psychological and financial consequences.  BUT, the few PRC 
Mandatory Prosecution cases disclose that a guilty verdict is the rarity (2 out 
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of 9) and prison time for the defendant, is to date, non-existent.  On the other 
hand, a measure of vengeance has been extracted from the accused. 
 
2. Harm to the General Public 
 
The clearest example of harm to the public interest is the Chinese Ship 
Captain case.  A Chinese ship captain was tried on a PRC mandated 
indictment that charged him with fault in a confrontation with Japanese 
Coast Guard vessels close to the Senkaku islands.  The Japanese government 
contended that he was violating Japanese territorial waters.  China also 
claims the Islands.  After seizure of the Captain’s boat his crew, but not the 
Captain, was allowed to return to Japan.  An international dispute between 
Japan and China was magnified when China cut off Japan’s supply of 
Chinese produced “rare earth” metals endangering the Japanese electronics 
industry.  Japan eventually sent the Captain back to China and no prosecution 
by the professional prosecutors was initiated.  It appeared the matter was 
over.  However, a complaint was filed with a PRC on Okinawa and the PRC 
on two occasions determined that the Captain should be indicted.  The 
Mandatory Prosecution resulted in a criminal case against the Captain. China 
refused to return the Captain to Japan to stand trial.  As process of the 
Japanese court, where the trial was to be held, could not be served on the 
Captain in the time required by Japanese court rules (because the Captain 
was at home in China), the case was eventually dismissed.  But not before it 
harmed several industries in Japan (including the electronics industry, a main 
stay of Japan’s economy) as well as damaging Japan’s relations with 
China—Japan’s nearest big country neighbor and its second largest trading 
partner. 
The harm to Japanese/Chinese relations was not simply tactical it was 
real and has had an extended effect.  It is likely that the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry worked long and hard to try to repair the damaged relations between 
China and Japan.  How long lasting the harm remained or even if a fragment 
still remains is uncertain.  Harm was, of course, avoidable—except that the 
PRC process once started was on “auto pilot” and once the PRC twice said 
the Captain should be indicted there was no choice but to do so.  China could 
hardly be expected to accept this explanation. 
Clearly Mandatory Prosecution in the Ship Captain case was not in the 
interest of the Japanese public.  Why was the ship captain indicted?  Was it 
because he was Chinese or was it because he was testing Japan’s claim to 
sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands?  Or was it because the PRC met in 
Okinawa, which has its own disputes (including historical and American 
Base issues) with the Japanese Government housed in Tokyo?  What 
motivated the PRC?  We do not know.  But it is difficult to believe that it 
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was because anyone realistically thought the Captain would be tried in Japan, 
convicted in Japan and pay some penalty in Japan.  Were such events even 
considered by the PRC whose role was simply to decide whether the Captain 
should have been charged by the Prosecutor’s Office?  China reacted to the 
indictment in the way one would expect a Great Power with authoritarian 
leadership would react—it felt insulted and cut Japan off from supplies of 
materials that were needed by one of Japan’s largest industries to show its 
displeasure. Japan had released the Captain before PRC proceedings but the 
PRC process continued and he was indicted under the Mandatory 
Prosecution process.  The case was dismissed because the Captain hadn’t 
been served with process in a timely manner.  But that eventuality was 
clearly predictable prior to the PRC proceedings.  He was in China when the 
PRC process resulting in Mandatory Prosecution began and when it finished.  
The Japanese Government’s relation with its large neighbor and second 
largest trading partner—China—was severely damaged.  Diplomacy could 
not play its designated role—the PRC could not be stopped. 
It is likely that the Japanese foreign Office was greatly distressed by the 
mandatory proceeding against the ship captain.  The PRC’s action certainly 
did not help diplomacy surrounding the Senkaku Islands dispute nor 
relations with China in general.  A trial would not have been in Japan’s 
industrial and/or economic interest.  While trial was avoided, indictment had 
not been in Japan’s industrial or economic interest. 
Once the PRC Mandatory Prosecution determination is handed down all 
the various complications arising from being an indicted person begin to 
flow.  So too all the complications for Japan (as a nation) flow.  The 
Government of Japan could not stop the Chinese Ship Caption criminal 
prosecution—the Government was held hostage to the PRC Mandatory 
Prosecution which, in turn, had to run its inevitable course; dismissal of the 
charges. 
While the Chinese Ship Captain case is the clearest case of general 
public interest damage, the PRC Mandated Prosecution against Ichiro Ozawa 
is likely the case which best illustrates how the public interest can be (and 
likely was) damaged by a process that once begun is on auto pilot with no 
possibility of government or official or expert review.  
Ichiro Ozawa was required to step down from his leadership position in 
the Opposition Party.  The Party in turn needed to keep a distance from 
Ozawa so as not to be painted in the upcoming election with the same brush 
that had painted Ozawa.  Ozawa was, for all intents and purposes not 
involved in the election that followed his PRC Mandatory Prosecution 
charge.  The effects on Japan’s democracy may have been significant. 
Ozawa was not just any politician—he had been the leader of a 
successful attempt to oust the LDP from its almost perennial status as ruling 
4 - Goodman 7/29/2020  10:03 AM 
388 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:3 
Party since its foundation brought about by the merger of the rival 
conservative Liberal and Democratic Parties.  He had been a senior executive 
of the Ruling LDP before forming his own Party.  He was a significant player 
in Japanese politics.  While his political mentors had been brought down by 
professional prosecutors Ozawa had been spared because of lack of 
evidence. 
Ichiro Ozawa’s criminal prosecution required him to step down from a 
leadership position in the Opposition Party that was seeking to unseat the 
virtually perennial LDP leadership in the Diet.  Consequently he was a minor 
figure in the attempt to unseat the ruling party—a consequence that may have 
seriously affected the election.  This is especially so if one believes (as I do) 
that the continued dominance of the LDP comes not from overwhelming 
public approval of the LDP but because the Opposition has been found by 
the public to lack the ability or capacity to effectively govern.  I doubt that 
charge could be laid at Ozawa’s doorstep as it was at the door steps of Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama, Naoto Kan and Yoshihiko Nada—all Democratic 
Party of Japan Prime Ministers (over a period of just over 3 years). 
It would turn out that while corruption lay at the heart of the Ozawa 
prosecution it was not corruption by Ozawa but corruption in (but not 
condoned by) the Prosecutor’s Office.  Testimony given before the PRC by 
a member of the Prosecutor’s Office was inaccurate and the inaccuracy 
related to the critical question of Ozawa’s knowledge of certain events.  The 
inaccuracy was easily provable—but not provable until the trial on the PRC 
mandated charges was in full swing; thus not provable until after the election.  
Ozawa’s Secretary had been interviewed by the Prosecutor Service when it 
was considering whether to bring charges.  The Secretary secretly recorded 
his interview with the prosecutors and the tape told the story of the 
inaccuracy.  The Secretary had not said that Ozawa knew of the wrong 
doing).  Tape or no tape once the PRC had twice voted that the prosecutor 
service should have charged Ozawa the case needed to be tried.  Ozawa was 
out of the political fray.  The LDP triumphed in the election; the fairness of 
the election itself suffered from the indictment and trial as Ozawa, Japan’s 
Kingmaker and “shadow shogun” was forced to remain on the sidelines. 
Once the tape was presented to the trial court the case was on route to a 
not guilty verdict—but not before the harm to the electoral process had been 
done.  The Secretary who blew the case against Ozawa out of the water had 
been indicted by the professional prosecutors for his activities (which Ozawa 
did not know about).  He was convicted. 
Not only does the Ozawa case disclose the harm to the democratic 
system that PRC Mandatory Prosecution can cause but it also shows that the 
PRC system can be corrupted to benefit the Prosecutor’s Office.  Ozawa was 
in the Prosecutor’s cross hairs for years.  Whether because he had not done 
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anything wrong or because he was too careful and too smart to leave a trail 
that could ensnare him is not important for our purposes.  What is important 
is that the Prosecutor’s Office could not, on its own, bring a prosecution 
against Ozawa—much as it likely wanted to.  Instead a political group 
opposing Ozawa brought a PRC complaint.  This caused the Prosecutors to 
look at the case again and the Mandatory Prosecution process caused the 
Prosecutor’s Office to give testimony to the PRC.  That testimony, which 
misstated the interrogation session with Ozawa’s Secretary, was likely 
critical to the PRC’s determination (a second time) to require prosecution. 
I do not mean to suggest that the Prosecutor’s Office choreographed the 
misstatement of the Secretary’s interview.  Indeed, considering the 
professionalism of the Prosecutor Service it is difficult to believe that the 
Office was involved in the misstatements.  But, the misstatements did result 
in Ozawa’s prosecution—something the Office wanted but could not 
achieve.  What this shows is that the PRC system can be manipulated and 
used to get indictments that the Prosecutors Office wants but does not want 
to be held responsible for obtaining.  If so manipulated, the Prosecutors can 
exert substantial influence over elections at a National and/or Prefectural and 
even Mayoralty level.  The purpose of the PRC process was to limit what the 
Occupation saw as too much power in the hands of the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office.  The Ozawa case shows that the potential exists to use the PRC 
process to expand the Prosecutor’s power. 
Not only the Public Prosecutor’s Office but private citizens or groups 
can use the PRC process to seek to embarrass private or public figure parties.  
Prime Minister Kan, whose forceful actions in going to Tohoku and taking 
charge of events at the time of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster (to the 
consternation of Japan’s powerful Bureaucracy) was the subject of a PRC 
complaint which of course drew headlines some of which highlighted 
questions concerning his actions.  He likely lost some of the political power 
needed to govern and needed for a Party opposing the LDP to remain in 
office.  It had been predicted that the amendment to the PRC law allowing 
Mandatory Prosecution could be used for political purposes.20 
I believe that what I said in 2017 remains true today: 
 
The PRC prosecution of a Chinese ship captain whose case 
was eventually dismissed caused strong anti-Japanese feelings 
in China and reprisal cutting off Japanese access to rare earth 
materials important to Japanese industry.  The PRC indictment 
of former LDP Secretary General and leading member of the 
 
 20. Jonathan David Marshall, Democratizing the Law in Japan, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK 
OF JAPANESE POLITICS 92, 98, 100 (Alisa Gaunder ed. 2011). 
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DPJ government, Ichiro Ozawa who was acquitted (upheld by 
the High Court and not further appealed) but not before 
throwing Japanese politics into confusion.  Facing indictment 
Ozawa could not become DPJ President (hence Prime Minister, 
as the consent of the Prime Minister is required to proceed 
criminally against a cabinet member—including the Prime 
Minister).  Ozawa’s trial highlighted prosecutor misconduct.  
The action of eleven lay persons caused a tidal wave of 
problems for the then ruling DPJ.  Prime Minster Kan was the 
subject of PRC review arguing his actions as Prime Minister 
were responsible for the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster—the PRC 
refused to indict.21 
 
If anything good came out of the Ozawa trial it was that the secretly 
taped interrogation session when compared to the testimony given to the 
PRC gave a boost to the use of full recording of Prosecutor interrogation 
sessions in Japan. 
 
3. The Need for a Grown-up in the Room 
 
The PRC places the criminal Justice system on auto pilot once the PRC 
twice decides that an indictment should issue and charges should be brought. 
As shown above placing the criminal Justice system on auto pilot after a PRC 
Mandatory Prosecution determination has had consequences that affected 
charged parties, the public interest and perhaps even the fairness of a national 
election.  That need not be the case.  There can still be citizen participation 
in the prosecution decision without placing ultimate authority in the hands 
of ordinary citizens who may not be familiar with the legal consequences of 
their acts or who may not have considered (indeed under the PRC process 
are not charged with considering) whether the Prosecutors in deciding not to 
prosecute acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably (the standard for 
examining administrative action under the United States  Administrative 
Procedure Act). 
I previously suggested a body to review the determination of the PRC 
that there should be mandatory prosecution to see if that decision conforms 
to the national interest and properly take into account the defendant’s 
rights—a “grown-up in the room.”  I remain convinced that such a reform 
would serve the public interest.  Such body need not, indeed should not, be 
staffed by political figures or government employees.  Surely there are 
 
 21. CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 383 
(Kluwer Law Int’l, 4th rev. ed. 2017) (footnotes omitted). 
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former governmental officials removed from policy who, together with 
nongovernmental officials, would garner public support for their position to 
set aside a PRC determination in favor of Mandatory Prosecution in a 
particular case.  And such a body would give greater credence to the PRC’s 
determination that prosecution should be brought when (and if) they accept 
such determination.  A body that is balanced in view surely could be found. 
Without saying that the below suggestion for such a body is the only viable 
alternative I throw it out as an example of what might be appropriate.  
A group composed of a retired Justice (perhaps a retired Chief Justice) 
of the Supreme Court, an official of the local (where the indictment if issued 
would be handed down and the case tried) Bengoshi kai (Bar Association) 
and a figure from a leading University Faculty that deals with the subject of 
the indictment.  For example, a Professor of International Affairs to review 
the Chinese ship Captain case or a leading Law Professor familiar with 
Statute of Limitations issues to deal with the Vice Chief of Police case, could 
bring the international complications out in the open in the former and the 
time blocking effect of the Limitations law in the later, for the other two 
members of the group.  A majority decision of the three to overrule the 
mandatory prosecution determination would be required.  Amongst other 
things this group could consider the likelihood of success of prosecution as 
well as whether the Prosecutor Services decision reflects a reasonable, or at 
least a not unreasonable, exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  The group 
would consider both the victim’s interest in prosecution and the potential 
defendant’s interest in not prosecuting. It would not review PRC rejection of 
Mandatory Prosecution. 
 
4. The Need for Citizen Participation to Check the Power of the 
Professional Prosecutors. 
 
In the case of the Saiban’in trial citizen participation can check the 
professional Judge’s decision to convict and can affect the sentence rendered 
in the case; likewise the professional Judge participation can check the 
instincts of the citizen Judges.  Public participation in the indictment process 
through the PRC is more limited—it can only lead to indictment not to 
refusal to indict. It cannot affect the decisions of the Prosecutors Office to 
prosecute.  But it is at the all-important indictment stage (in a system with 
over a 95% conviction rate) that a check on the prosecutor is most important. 
Unlike the American Federal Grand Jury which can reject the prosecutor’s 
Bill of Indictment the PRC plays no role in the decision to indict.  And unlike 
the federal United States Attorney, whose signature is required for a federal 
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indictment and who may refuse to sign an indictment22 neither the Japanese 
Prosecutor nor anyone else can sidetrack a PRC’s second decision to compel 
prosecution.  But as the Cox case shows there may be situations where an 
indictment is inappropriate and where the rights of the person subject to 
indictment should be taken into account.  Who is there who can perform that 
function in the PRC context of modern Japan?  No one. 
I suggested in 2014 that this void needs to be reevaluated.  The rights of 
the accused or potentially to be accused need to be taken into consideration 
by the Criminal Justice system.  I believe that the primary function of the 
U.S. Grand Jury—the function of private citizens having the power to check 
the desire of the Federal Prosecutor to indict and try a suspect—should also 
be performed by private citizens in Japan.  This role of private citizens allows 
the professional prosecutors to continue their oft times enlightened view of 
Rehabilitative Justice while checking the ability of the prosecutor service to 
indict in situations where indictment may not be seen by the public to be 
appropriate. 
In many Civil Law systems Prosecutors are themselves judicial officials 
(perhaps equivalent to something like the Magistrate in the United States 
Federal System).  They are in charge of investigations and make the ultimate 
decision whether or not to seek indictment.  But they are subject to 
professional review by other Magistrate Judges and such review may temper 
their prosecution decisions.  In other systems the Police and Prosecutors are 
subject to supervision by a Magistrate Judge who overseas and either 
confirms or approves lines of inquiry and actions of the investigators.  This 
Judicial official makes the ultimate indict or not indict decision. Such system 
does not exist in Japan.23  But, the existence of such systems indicates that a 
Civil Law Judicial System can provide protections against excessive 
prosecution. 
Decisions of Japanese Prosecutors are subject to review in the 
prosecutor’s office by peers and supervisors but this internal review does not 
provide the kind of “outside” review that the prosecution decision deserves.  
It is possible that a group of ordinary citizens will view a confession obtained 
after 23 days (or more) of continuous questioning by prosecutors in the 
confines of a police jail with the suspect’s lawyer not allowed to be present 
and with prosecutors in control of breaks, exercise, etc. as subject to question 
 
 22. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 189-90 (5th Cir. 1965). 
 23. I do not suggest such a system for Japan.  Placing judicial officials in the position of 
approving indictment leads to the trial of the criminal case appearing to be (if not in fact being) a 
trial of whether the judicial official’s decision to indict was correct.  The presumption of innocence 
which should accompany all criminal cases might be lost by such a system as a judicial official 
(the indicting Magistrate) has already approved indictment meaning has made a decision that there 
is evidence that the accused committed the crime. 
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as to its voluntariness and thus require that the Prosecutor have more in the 
way of objective evidence to make out a prima facie case; or that such group 
of ordinary citizens will wish to hear the audio tapes of the interrogation 
sessions (and more sessions are being fully recorded since the Ozawa case) 
before accepting the confession as voluntary.  Having to justify their 
interrogation and/or investigative techniques to ordinary citizens may result 
in an improvement in such techniques much as the Supreme Court’s decision 
in the Miranda case24 requiring that suspects be given warnings regarding 
their right to remain silent and have the assistance of counsel before 
answering police or prosecutor interrogations resulted in better interrogation 
techniques and increased the level of police professionalism in the United 
States.25  This has likely resulted in fewer false confessions than was the case 
prior to Miranda and might help relieve the false confession problems that 
currently exist in Japan today and might serve to speed up trials in criminal 
cases in Japan.  Importantly, requiring prosecutors to support their 
indictments before a group of ordinary citizens reduces the ability of the 
State to use the criminal law system to achieve the State’s own ends to the 
disadvantage to its citizens. 
Citizen participation in trials in some cases in Japan has had spin off 
benefits to the criminal justice process.  It has ushered in (first in Saiban’in 
cases but extending to some other cases as well) “pretrial procedures” that 
have enabled defendants to gain access to some information in the hands of 
prosecutors which could help the Saiban’in Panel reach a more reasoned and 
just decision than if such information remained in the bottom of the 
prosecutor’s file cabinets.  It has provided for a more objective trial and has 
provided the public with a better understanding of the processes of the 
criminal Justice system.  It has allowed prosecutors and political leaders to 
get feedback from citizen judges regarding such important subjects of 
criminal justice as capital punishment and confessions.  Few of these benefits 
were considered or even imagined when the Saiban’in System was adopted.  
There is reason to believe that spin off benefits would also accrue to the 
criminal justice system by requiring that prosecutors convince a group of 
ordinary citizens that the government has sufficient evidence to make out a 
 
 24. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 25. Richard A Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 
669-670, 672.  “Miranda has increased the level of professionalism among police officers and 
detectives.  By laying down a formal rule that establishes regular procedures for interrogations, 
Miranda has created objective and written standards of accountability for custodial police behavior. 
… Miranda has increased police professionalism by rendering interrogation practices more visible 
to and thus more subject to supervision and control by other actors within the criminal justice 
system—especially police managers, prosecutors, and judges. In short, in the last thirty years 
Miranda has exerted a civilizing effect on police behavior and in so doing has professionalized the 
interrogation process in America ….” 
4 - Goodman 7/29/2020  10:03 AM 
394 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:3 
prima facie case that the defendant who is about to be indicted actually 




Looking at public participation in the charging process through the lens 
of the PRC Mandatory Indictment process is, it is submitted, looking at the 
problem through the wrong lens of the telescope.  Public participation is 
needed in the far more numerous instances where the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office determines to indict.  An amendment to the PRC law to give the public 
a role in the indictment decision would, I suggest, be in the interest of the 
Japanese Public, would modify Prosecutor conduct in a way that betters the 
Criminal Justice System, would serve to better protect the rights of the 
accused and would shine a needed light on Prosecutorial actions. 
Moreover the handful of PRC Mandatory Prosecution cases tried and 
decided since the amendment of the PRC law allowing citizen mandated 
Prosecution has resulted in damage to Japanese citizens, has rendered 7 not 
guilty verdicts out of a total of only 9 cases and in the 2 conviction cases one 
defendant was fined the equivalent of $90 USD.  And the other received a 
suspended sentence.  No one has gone to jail as a consequence of the PRC’s 
actions.  Nor has there been a single conviction of a public figure for 
corruption or corrupting activities.  On the other hand, PRC Mandatory 
Prosecution has created complications for Japanese foreign relations and 
Japanese industry and has had affected Japan’s democracy and electoral 
system.  This need not be; a reputable, professional, knowledgeable and 
acceptable to the public body that reviews the handful of PRC twice 
recommended for prosecution cases to determine whether there is a 
reasonable expectation of success if prosecution is brought and whether 
prosecution is in the public interest should resolve many of the problems that 
the PRC Mandatory Prosecutions to date have highlighted. 
 
